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Abstract
The global crisis that erupted in 2007 led many countries to embark on countercyclical 
fiscal policies as a way to cushion the blow of a depressed aggregate demand. Advo-
cates of discretionary measures emphasize that fiscal policy can indeed stimulate the 
economy. The main goal of this work is to assess whether the fiscal policies pursued by 
the Brazilian government in the aftermath of the 2008 crisis, succeeded in bringing the 
economy back on track in a sustainable fashion. To this end, the fiscal multipliers of five 
different shocks are studied in a small open-economy New Keynesian framework. Our 
results point to the government spending and public investment as the most effective 
fiscal tools for combating the crisis. However, the highest fiscal multiplier turned out 
to be the one associated with excise tax reductions.
Keywords
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Resumo
A crise global que surgiu in 2007 levou a muitos países a embarcarem em políticas 
fiscais anticíclicas como forma de amortecer o impacto de uma demanda agregada em 
queda. Os defensores de medidas discricionárias enfatizam que a política fiscal pode de 
fato estimular a economia. O principal objetivo deste trabalho é avaliar se as políticas 
fiscais desenvolvidas pelo governo brasileiro na sequência da crise de 2008 tiveram 
sucesso em por a economia no caminho da recuperação de uma maneira sustentável. 
♦ The first author thanks CAPES for financial support through the PNPD grant. The authors are 
grateful to the anonymous reviewer, the participants of the EcoMod 2016 International Con-
ference on Economic Modeling, 2016, Lisbon and the participants of the 19th International 
Conference on Macroeconomic Analysis and International Finance, 2015, Crete.
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Para fazer isso, estudam-se os multiplicadores fiscais de cinco choques diferentes através 
de um modelo Novo-Keynesiano de uma pequena economia aberta. Nossos resultados 
apontam para o gasto público e o investimento público como os instrumentos fiscais 
mais efetivos no combate à crise. Porém, o multiplicador fiscal mais alto resultou ser o 
associado às reduções no imposto sobre o consumo.
Palavras-Chave
Modelos DSGE. Multiplicadores Fiscais. Novo Modelo Keynesiano.
JEL Classification
C63. E37. E62.
1. Introduction
In 2008 the Brazilian government, in attempt to unleash more re-
sources to households so as to increase private consumption, wide-
ned the existing range of top marginal rates in which the personal 
income tax was structured. In addition, it lowered the tax on ma-
nufactured products (IPI) in the acquisition of cars and trucks. On 
the spending side, public investment plans as well as government 
current expenditure growth were maintained throughout the year 
2009 in the midst of falling fiscal revenues owing to the economic 
slowdown (MOREIRA, 2010).
Also, with the aim of boosting aggregate demand, the Brazilian 
government launched the so-called PAC 2 in March 2010, with 
an estimate of around R$ 1,59 trillions. This program, which was 
an extension of the Growth Acceleration Program (Programa de 
Aceleração do Crescimento - PAC-,1 in Portuguese) created in 
January 2007, projected investments of R$ 503,9 billions up until 
2010.
This article aims to shed some light on the discussion about the 
effects of the post-2008 Brazilian fiscal policy, on both the reve-
nue and the expenditure sides. Specifically, we set out to examine 
whether this fiscal expansion had a positive (and permanent) effect 
on the economic activity by focusing on the analysis of the fiscal 
multiplier on each sort of stimulus considered, namely tax cuts on 
1 PAC is a Brazilian federal government’s program consisting of a set of economic policies 
(investment in infrastructure, housing, transport, energy and water, among others) targeted 
at contributing to the acceleration of Brazilian economic growth.
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consumption, on labor income, on capital gains, government con-
sumption and investment shocks. The baseline model we employ is a 
small open-economy New Keynesian one with the standard frictions 
(price and wage rigidity, habit formation in consumption, investment 
adjustment costs, Ricardian and non-Ricardian consumers, cost of 
servicing a growing net foreign debt and variable capital utilization) 
in which both public spending and tax shocks are included and the 
parameters have been estimated through Bayesian methodology. It 
also features public capital stock as an input, which allows for the 
analysis of the effects of shocks to public investment on the marginal 
productivity of private inputs and on the GDP.
The analyses carried out in this paper highlight that output was 
mainly driven by changes in the two expenditure-based measures 
considered, current spending and public investment. From 2003 
through 2006, cuts in both expenditure items were instrumental 
in decreasing aggregate demand. Furthermore, subsequent increa-
ses in both items, due to the implementation of PAC1 and, par-
ticularly PAC2, were found to be the primary forces behind the 
renewed impetus to the economic activity and thus, the main lever 
to overcome the crisis. However, the effects of these expansionary 
measures only lasted until 2013, when the economy started to de-
teriorate. Besides, we also find that for the case of Brazil, the fiscal 
multipliers studied are remarkably low and seem to be in line with 
the figures that the literature sets for high-debt emerging and de-
veloping countries (Batini et al., 2014; Ilzetzki et al., 2013). As far 
as the size of the fiscal multiplier is concerned, the most effective 
stimulus was the consumption-tax cut, followed by the rise in cur-
rent spending. Income-tax related measures and increases in public 
investment appear to have negligible effects on output. According to 
our results, the Brazilian government would then be advised to lean 
on consumption-tax cuts and increases in current expenditure as a 
way to attain the highest efficacy at boosting output.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: section 2 in-
troduces the definition and Literature; section 3 shows the model; 
sections 4 and 5 explain the data, calibration and estimation of the 
structural parameters, respectively. Section 6 presents the results; 
after, section 7 concludes.
Estud. Econ., São Paulo, vol.47, n.1, p.93-124 , jan.-mar. 2017
96          Celso José Costa Junior, Alejandro C. García Cintado e Armando Vaz Sampaio
2. Fiscal multiplier: definition and literature
This section intends to lay out the fiscal multiplier definition used 
throughout this paper, as well as present the national and interna-
tional literature covering the topic at hand.
Definition 2.1 (Fiscal multiplier). It is the ratio of a change in ou-
tput ( )Y∆  to an exogenous change in fiscal policy (increase in pu-
blic spending, ( )G∆ , or tax cut, ( )T∆ ). There are different sorts of 
multipliers:
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t
t
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In discussing the values of the multipliers associated with each fiscal 
policy measure, we choose to work with the latter as it is the most 
common one used within the literature.
Due to the rapid development of the fiscal policy literature, it is 
now well accepted that the size of the fiscal multipliers is influen-
ced by several factors. Every time the government carries out an 
expansionary fiscal policy, a bit of that effect is saved and/or used to 
buy imports (this is referred to as leakages in the literature). These 
leakages are greater when it comes to tax exemptions than in the 
case of public spending, as the latter impacts the aggregate demand 
directly. That said, some relevant variables that account for the size 
of those leakages are the marginal propensity to consume, the mar-
ginal propensity to import, liquidity-constrained agents (non-Ricar-
dian households) and the existence of automatic stabilizers, among 
others. The way the monetary authority reacts to the fiscal shock is 
also decisive, as if it accommodates the ensuing demand expansion - 
by holding the basic interest rate constant in response to this higher 
aggregate demand -, investment and consumption will fall less than 
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in the case the central bank pursues a tighter monetary policy (lower 
crowding-out effect).
Finally, it can be interesting to present the expected values for the 
fiscal multipliers. A “rule of thumb” is a public-spending multiplier 






∆
∆
G
Y
 between 1 and 1,5 for the large economies, between 0,5 and 
1 for medium-size economies, and smaller than 0,5 in case of small 
economies (the Brazilian case). Overall, multipliers associated with 
tax revenues, public investment or income transfers amount to half 
of the value of the spending multipliers. Having negative fiscal mul-
tipliers is possible, especially if the fiscal boost worsens the public 
debt sustainability (Spilimbergo et al., 2009).
The national literature is relatively scant, and this scarcity grows 
when it comes to articles employing DSGE models to address this 
issue. However, three articles can be deemed as the pioneers in clo-
sing this gap. The first one is Moura (2015), where the author uses 
a DSGE model to derive present-value multipliers related to public 
consumption and investment. Although the aforementioned model 
has significant strengths, its main weakness has to do with the fact 
that the author does not consider distortionary taxes into the model, 
which does not contribute to enriching the debate. His results show 
that, in spite of the effect of public consumption on GDP being po-
sitive on impact, the long-run effect is smaller than unity in all the 
scenarios analyzed (for some parameterizations the said effect was 
even negative). According to the author, the cause of this low long
-run value resides in the need of fiscal adjustment, leading to future 
decreases in public consumption and investment. On the contrary, 
not only does the government investment have a positive impact on 
the economy in the short run, but its long-run effect exceeds the 
unity. This is because the bigger stock of public capital brings about 
productivity gains for the whole economy.
The second paper is Cavalcanti and Vereda (2014) in which they 
quantify and compare the macroeconomic impacts of several kinds 
of public spending - purchases of goods and services, investments, 
social transfers and public wages and salaries - under different fiscal 
rules. This work is however limited in the sense that the analysis re-
lies on a calibrated but not estimated DSGE model for the Brazilian 
economy. The chief results obtained by those authors indicate that, 
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under rules of tax-based fiscal consolidations, the larger positive 
short-run effect on GDP arises from the increase in public employ-
ment, whereas the most negative effect associates itself with income 
transfers. On the other hand, under fiscal rules for some spending 
item, there does not exist any type of public outlay that gives rise 
to a significant positive impact on GDP in the short run. In the 
medium run, the best way to make GDP grow is via increases in 
public investment, which can lead to substantially greater-than-unity 
multipliers, depending on the fiscal rule in use. In addition, under a 
permanent balanced budget policy, the majority of public expendi-
ture items yield negligible or even negative multipliers, as opposed 
to positive ones when a policy of delayed or partial fiscal adjustment 
is conducted.
Carvalho and Valli (2011) created a model with great acceptance 
among academics working with DSGE in Brazil. These authors in-
troduced that governments intervene in the economy through the 
accumulation of public capital with an impact on factor productivity 
and in the overall demand for investment goods. Different from this 
work, where the firm does not choose the amount of public capi-
tal that one will use in its production process, Carvalho and Valli 
(2011) assumed that firms can selectively choose between public 
and private capital services. This modeling choice was intended to 
capture the significant presence of the Brazilian government in the 
productive sector of the economy. This model works with two types 
of households; the first has more specialized labor services2 where 
the second does not. Wages and prices have rigidities but there are 
still consumption habits. Among the shocks proposed by the authors, 
there are shocks in the primary surplus/GDP, in the public invest-
ments and in public transfers/GDP.
In the international literature, DSGE models are relied upon even 
more intensely in the study of fiscal multipliers. Zubairy (2010) esti-
mates a DSGE model with fiscal features using Bayesian techniques 
for the U.S. economy. The author finds a public-spending multiplier 
of 1,12, in contrast to the tax exemptions from labor income and 
capital income, whose multipliers are 0,13 and 0,33, respectively. 
Christiano et al. (2009), by means of a DSGE model, seek to ob-
tain a greater-than-one multiplier when the economy is at the zero 
lower bound. They come up with a multiplier effect which is subs-
2  Just a different way of denominating non-Ricardian agents.
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tantially larger than one, this result being fully consistent with the 
behavior of the main macroeconomic variables over the 2008 crisis. 
Woodford (2010) also tackles shocks to government expenditures. 
Throughout this article, the author aims at providing an explanation 
for the main factors determining the efficiency of fiscal stimulus on 
output and employment by using a New-Keynesian model. Results 
show that delays in the price and wage adjustment can raise the size 
of public-spending multipliers, and that its value would be bigger than 
one as long as the monetary authority keeps interest rates unchanged. 
Meanwhile, that value can be far lower if the monetary authority bids 
up interest rates in response to a rise in spending.
It may also be worth reviewing some articles that do not resort to 
DSGE models in accounting for the effectiveness of fiscal policies 
and their associated multipliers for the case of Brazil. Cavalcanti 
and Silva (2010) attempt to understand the effects of fiscal policy 
for this economy over a period spanning 1995 to 2008 by making 
use of a VAR model that emphasizes the role of public debt in the 
efficiency of fiscal policy. Their results suggest that there exists an 
explicit role of public debt in the evolution of the fiscal variables 
over economic activity. Therefore, a fiscal shock influencing public 
debt should engender future movements in public expenditures and 
revenues which tend to attenuate the initial effects of the shock.
Mendonça et al. (2010) deploy data spanning from 1995 to 2007, 
so as to investigate the effects of fiscal shocks on the Brazilian eco-
nomy. Their results imply that private consumption and interest ra-
tes rise as government spending unexpectedly goes up. Nevertheless, 
output is very likely to fall. These results point to the presence of 
crowding-out effects between public spending and private invest-
ment. As regards the expansionary shock to revenues, it is possible 
for output to drop in the short run, but a positive reaction of this 
variable is likely to materialize in the longer run.
Peres and Ellery Junior (2009) examine the dynamic effects of 
shocks to federal fiscal variables on the economic activity in Brazil 
for the post-Real-Plan period by utilizing a Structural VAR compri-
sing output, public spending and net taxes. These authors compare 
their results with those found in the international literature for the 
case of the American economy and other OCDE countries and come 
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to the conclusion that they are similar in that the output response to 
fiscal shocks is positive but small in both economic areas.
Fantinatti (2015) looks into the policy of tax exemption applied to the 
IPI on durable goods during the post-crisis 2008 period. His results 
underline the fact that fiscal boosts in the sector of durable goods 
were unimportant, and apparently the best tax-exemption  policy 
would be to foster the sector of non-durable goods on account of 
two main reasons: the share of non-durable goods over GDP; and 
the assumption that government consumption is biased towards 
non-durable goods, which renders fiscal adjustment less imperative.
3. The model
Our model follows the New-Keynesian tradition and, in addition to 
price frictions, it features wage rigidity. It also encompasses non-Ri-
cardian agents, habit formation in consumption, investment adjust-
ment cost, cost of servicing a growing net foreign debt, and variable 
capital utilization. This section intends to describe the economy 
under discussion by focusing first on households, then presenting 
firms, next the government and ending with the external sector.
3.1.   Households
There is a continuum of households indexed by [ ]1,0∈j . A share Rω  
of this continuum of households indexed by [ )RR ω,0∈  have access 
to financial markets, and they behave as Ricardian agents, that is, 
they maximize their intertemporal utility. The remaining share of 
households indexed by ( ]1,RNR ω∈  cannot save and simply consume 
their after-tax disposable income. This type of agent is referred to 
as non-Ricardian household in the literature.
3.1.1.  Determining consumption and saving of the Ricardian household
The representative ricardian household is assumed to maximize its 
inter-temporal utility by choosing consumption, savings, investment 
and leisure. As for the saving decision, she can choose between 
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three different instruments - physical capital, foreign bonds and 
government bonds, indexed by j. In other words, this agent elects 
how much to consume, how much to work and how much to save 
and invest by accumulating financial assets and physical capital in 
order to maximize the discounted stream of expected utility.
The stand-in consumer’s formal problem boils down to,
( )
∑
∞
=
+−
−
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and to the following law of motion for capital,
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The intertemporal preference shock:
 tP
P
t
PP
t SS ,1loglog ερ += −                                                                      (4)
where  ( )PtP N σε ,0~, .
The labor supply shock:
 tL
L
t
LL
t SS ,1loglog ερ += −                                                                     (5)
where  ( )LtL N σε ,0~, .
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The quality of investment shock:
 tI
I
t
II
t SS ,1loglog ερ += −                                                                      (6)
where  ( )ItI N σε ,0~, .
where tE  is the expectations operator, 10 << β is the intertempo-
ral discount factor, RC  denotes consumption, RL denotes labor, 
PS  
refers to the intertemporal shock, LS  is the shock on labor supply, ϕ  
is the marginal disutility of labor and σ  is the coefficient of relative 
risk aversion.
Regarding the budget constraint, P  is the general price level, PI  is 
private investment, B  is a one-year government bond, FB  is a one-
year foreign bond, BR  is the rate of return on the government bond 
(basic interest rate), FR denotes the world interest rate, S is the no-
minal exchange rate, W  is the wage, R  is the return to capital, 
PK  
is the private stock of capital, U  is the capital utilization rate, χ  is a 
parameter governing the adjustment cost’s sensitivity, TRANS  is the 
net income transfers to households by the government, KLC τττ ,,
stand for the consumption tax rate, labor-income tax rate and capi-
tal-income tax rate, respectively. The term ( ) 


 −+ t
F
SSj
F
tj
BF SBB ,1,2
χ
 
stationarity-inducing technique (SCHMITT-GROHÉ and URIBE, 
2003).
We adopt the convention that B
 
and FB
 
are the nominal bonds 
issued in (t-1) and matured in t. For convenience, all bonds are re-
garded to be one-period bonds. Hence, both  1+tB , 
F
tB 1+ and 
P
tK 1+  are 
decided in t.
Solving the Ricardian household’s problem, we are left with the 
following first-order conditions:
( ) ( ) ( )[ ]σσ φβφφτλ −++−− −−−=+ tjRCtjRPttCtjRCtjRPtCtttjR CCSECCSP ,,1,,11,,,,,, 1 (7)
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3.1.2. Determining consumption and saving of the non-Ricardian 
household
The non-Ricardian household’s behavior is simpler owing to her li-
quidity constraint which does not enable her to maximize her utility 
intertemporally. Thus, the non-Ricardian agent’s consumption must 
match her current income each period. In reality, even without ac-
cess to “credit”, this kind of agent would be able to carry over cur-
rent income into the future (by saving). In order to make the model 
more tractable, this agent will be also assumed to be unable to save. 
Therefore, the problem faced by this non-Ricardian consumer is:
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subject to her budget constraint,
 ( ) ( ) ( ) ttRLttjNRttjNRCtt PTRANSLWCP ωττ −+−=+ 111 ,,,,   (14)
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The first-order condition is the following:
 ( ) ( ) ( )[ ]σσ φβφφτλ −++−− −−−=+ tjNRCtjNRPttCtjNRCtjNRPtCtttjNR CCSECCSP ,,1,,11,,,,,, 1   (15)
3.1.3.  Wage setting
The household’s choice over the wage level entails the assumption 
that this agent supplies differentiated labor under a monopolistically 
competitive framework. This service is sold to a representative labor 
aggregator which combines all those different labor services ( )JL  
into a single input ( )L  by means of the Dixit-Stiglitz technology.
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The first-order condition is given by:
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This equation represents the household j’s demand for labor. 
Plugging the latter into the preceding technology (17) results in the 
aggregate wage level:
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In each period, a share Wθ−1  of households, which are randomly 
and independently chosen, set their wage in an optimal manner. The 
remaining households, Wθ , follow a sticky-wage rule ( )1,, −= tjtj WW .
 Post-2008 Brazilian fiscal policy                                                                                                                                          105
Estud. Econ., São Paulo, vol.47, n.1, p.93-124 , jan.-mar. 2017
In taking the decision to pick their wage level in the period t, the wa-
ge-setting households are aware they face the probability 
N
Wθ  of the 
wage being fixed for N periods in the future, regardless of whether 
the household makes the optimal choice *,tjW  in the current period. 
Accordingly, the household seeks to solve the following problem:
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where  { }NRRZ ,= .
subject to the household j’s demand for labor (18).
Solving that problem yields the following first-order conditions for 
both the Ricardian and non-Ricardian households:
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Because a share Wθ−1  of the households elect the same nominal 
wage, **, ttJ WW = , and the remaining share, Wθ , receive the same wage 
as in the preceding period, the aggregate nominal wage can be writ-
ten as follows:
 ( )[ ] WWW tWtWt WWW ψψψ θθ −−−− −+= 1
1
1*1
1 1                                         (23)
The gross wage-inflation rate can be defined as:
 1
,
−
=
t
t
tW W
W
π                                                                                                            (24)
Estud. Econ., São Paulo, vol.47, n.1, p.93-124 , jan.-mar. 2017
106          Celso José Costa Junior, Alejandro C. García Cintado e Armando Vaz Sampaio
3.4.   Combining consumption and labor
Aggregate consumption and labor, respectively, are given by:
 
 ( ) tNRRtRRt CCC ,, 1 ωω −+=                                                                             (25)
  ( ) tNRRtRRt LLL ,, 1 ωω −+=                                                                             (26)
3.2.  Firms
3.2.1.  Final good producer (Retail)
From an aggregate perspective, monopolistic competition involves, 
among other things, confronting the fact that consumers purchase 
a great variety of goods with the need of modeling in which the 
consumer is assumed to buy only a specific kind of good (a bundle 
comprised of all goods). This aggregate good is sold by a perfectly 
competitive retail firm. In other words, all the retailers are assumed 
identical to each other.
With the target of producing a bundle, the retailer must buy a large 
amount of wholesale goods. These are the inputs used in its pro-
duction process. Thus, the retail firm acquires a great variety of 
wholesale goods (clothing, electronics, etc.) and bundles them into 
a final good (a basket of goods) which will be sold to the final con-
sumer. In order to pose the problem faced by the retailer and solve 
for it, we must first describe its production technology. The aggre-
gation technology is given by the Dixit-Stiglitz aggregator (DIXIT 
and STIGLITZ, 1977).
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where tY  is the retailers’ output over periods t, and tjY ,  for [ ]1,0∈j  
is the wholesale good j. 1>ψ  refers to the elasticity of substitution 
between wholesale goods.
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It should be noted that the price of each wholesale good is taken as 
given by the retailer. Knowing that tP  and  tjP ,  denote the nominal 
prices of the retail good and the wholesale good j, respectively, the 
representative retail firm’s maximization problem takes the form:
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                                                         (28)
Substituting the aggregator (27) into the last Equation (28) leads to 
the following expression:
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By taking the first-order condition of the above problem, we get:
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This function portrays the demand for the wholesale good j, which 
rises with aggregate demand and is inversely related to its relative 
price level.
Plugging Equation (30) into Equation (27) yields the aggregate price 
level:
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3.2.2.  Intermediate good producer (wholesale)
Taking into account that domestic output is g iven by 
{ }XGICY P ,,,= , an intermediate-good producing firm solves its 
problem in three steps:  First, it chooses labor and capital so as to 
produce domestic inputs; right after, in order to determine the level 
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of its output, it chooses between domestic inputs versus imported 
inputs; finally, it sets the price of the good it sells.
In the first step, the firm operates under perfect competition and 
produces a domestic input, DtjINP , , using the following technology:
 
321
,,,,
ααα G
tjtj
P
tjt
D
tj KLKAINP =                                                (32)
where 1α , 2α  and 3α  stand for the share of private capital, labor 
and public capital in the production of domestic inputs, A  captures 
the economy’s level of technology which obeys the following law of 
motion:
 tAt
A
t AA ,1loglog ερ += −                                                                     (33)
where ( )AtA N σε ,0~, .
Hence, the firm’s goal is to minimize the cost of production:
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subject to the prior technological restriction (31).
It is not difficult to show that the first-order conditions with respect 
to PtjK , and tjL ,  are:
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The marginal cost is given by:
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In the second step, as already mentioned, the firm engages in de-
cision-making regarding the choice between using domestic inputs 
versus imported ones by means of the following technology:
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where Dω  represents the share of the domestic input in the produc-
tion of the intermediate good, and  Dψ  is the elasticity of substitu-
tion between domestic inputs and imported ones.
So the firm’s problem at this stage can be formally stated as:
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subject to the above technology.
By solving the previous problem, we obtain the following first-order 
condition:
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and,
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And the marginal cost is:
 ( )[ ] DDD FttDDtDtj PSPMC ψψψ ωω −−− −+= 1
1
11
, 1                                        (42)
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3.2.3.  Pricing a la Calvo
The third step of this problem amounts to setting the price of its 
good. This wholesale firm decides how much to produce in every 
period according to the Calvo rule (CALVO, 1983). There is a pro-
bability θ that the firm keeps the price of the good fixed in the next 
period ( )1,, −= tjtj PP  and a probability ( )θ−1  that it sets the price 
optimally ( )*,tjP . Once the price has been set in period t, there is 
the probability θ  that this price will remain fixed in period t+1, a 
probability 2θ that this price will remain fixed in period t+2, and so 
on. Accordingly, this firm should take into account these probabili-
ties when setting the price of its own good. The problem of the firm 
that adjusts the price of the good in period t is:
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subject to the demand for good itjY +,  (30).
The following first-order condition is obtained by rearranging fur-
ther the preceding equation:
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It is worth noting that all wholesale firms setting their prices share 
the same markup over the same marginal cost. This means that in all 
periods *,tjP  the price is the same for all ( )θ−1  firms adjusting their 
prices. Combining now the pricing rule (31) with the assumption 
that all price-changing firms set an equal price and that price-main-
taining firms leave the price unaffected - since they share the same 
technology -, yields the overall final price:
 ( )[ ] ψψψ θθ −−−− −+= 1
1
1*1
1 1 ttt PPP                                            (45)
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3.3.  Government
In our model the government comes into the picture by splitting 
itself into two different entities: a fiscal authority and a monetary 
authority. The former is held responsible for conducting fiscal policy, 
while the latter pursues the price stability through a Taylor rule.
3.3.1. Fiscal authority
The fiscal authority is tasked with taxing households’ income and 
issuing debt to finance its outlays, namely: current expenditure, tG
; public investment, PtI ; and net transfers to households, tTRANS . 
So the government’s budget constraint can be represented by:
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1,                                    (46)
The overall tax collection would be:
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The fiscal authority has three expenditure-based fiscal policy tools 
at its disposal: tG ; 
P
tI ; and tTRANS . On the revenue side, the tools 
the fiscal authority falls back on are: Ctτ ; 
L
tτ ; and 
K
tτ . All these ins-
truments follow the same fiscal policy rule:
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where Zγ  and Zφ  are parameters capturing the importance of the-
se fiscal policy tools relative to public debt sustainability, and the 
importance of the rule debt level relative to GDP, respectively, and 
{ }KtLtCttGtt TRANSIGZ τττ ,,,,,= .
The fiscal shock can be expressed as:
 tZ
Z
t
ZZ
t SS ,1loglog ερ += −                                                              (49)
where ( )ZtZ N σε ,0~, .
Estud. Econ., São Paulo, vol.47, n.1, p.93-124 , jan.-mar. 2017
112          Celso José Costa Junior, Alejandro C. García Cintado e Armando Vaz Sampaio
Likewise, the stock of public capital evolves according to the well- 
known law of motion:
 ( )
G
t
G
tG
G
t IKK +−=+ δ11                                                   (50)
where Gδ  denotes the rate of depreciation of public capital.
3.3.2.  Monetary authority
The Central Bank’s task is twofold: to foster output growth and to 
attain price stability. In order to accomplish this dual goal, it pursues 
a simple Taylor rule:
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where Yγ and πγ are the sensibilities of the interest rate to output 
and to the inflation rate, respectively, and Rγ  is a stabilization pa-
rameter. mtS  is the monetary shock, which abides by the following 
expression:
 tm
m
t
mm
t SS ,1loglog ερ += −                                                            (52)
where ( )mtm N σε ,0~, .
3.4.  External sector
The external sector is represented by the demand for the exported 
good, by the equilibrium condition of the balance of payments, and 
by the law of motion governing the movement of the foreign interest 
rate and the import price level. The export demand obeys a rule 
which depends on a stabilization component, on the real exchange 
rate and on a stochastic component:
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where Xγ  is a stabilization parameter, Xφ  is the sensibility of 
exports to the real exchange rate and XtS  is the shock to export 
demand, which is given by:
             tX
X
t
XX
t SS ,1loglog ερ += −                                                        (54)
where ( )XtX N σε ,0~, .
The external-sector balanced condition (balance of payments) can 
be stated as:
 ( ) ttttFtFtFtFtt XPIMPSPRBBS −=− −+ 11                                         (55)
The laws of motion for foreign interest rates and import price level 
are defined as:
 tRF
F
t
RFF
t RR ,1loglog ερ += −                                                      (56)
where  ( )RFtRF N σε ,0~, .
 tRF
F
t
RFF
t RR ,1loglog ερ += −                                                  (57)
where   ( )PFtPF N σε ,0~, .
3.5.  Equilibrium condition of the model
Finally, to close the model, the good-market equilibrium condition 
is given by: tt
G
t
P
ttt XGIICY ++++=
4.  Data
We then proceed to estimate the model using quarterly data 
spanning from 2002Q1 to 2014Q4 (52 data points). We use 
14 model variables as observables( ,,,,, RTCRTKpRTLTRANSP 3 
3 WLRTL Lτ= , RKpRTKp Kτ=  and ( )IpCRTC C += τ  where RTL, RTKp and RTC are 
revenue collected from the taxes on labor income, on capital gains and on consumption.
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)LSRIMPXCGCYR FB ,,,,,,,,,  which they are described in the 
Table 1. So, to prepare the data for the model estimation, we de-
flated using the IPCA, detrented and seasonally adjusted non sta-
tionary series using the software X12-ARIMA and applied first log-
difference. We have chosen this set of observables due to data avai-
lability and their relevance to our research purposes. Furthermore, 
a large set of observables mitigates the problem of identification.
5. Calibrated parameters, prior and posterior
In this section we pursue a two-tier approach: the parameters not 
directly related to the questions which we endeavor to answer 
throughout this article are calibrated, while those relevant parame-
ters for the analysis of the shock propagation are estimated using the 
Bayesian methodology. The main calibration procedure employed 
here is to pick up the values of parameters from other relevant arti-
cles in the DSGE model literature. Table 2 summarizes the calibra-
tion of the parameters.
Table 1 - Observables variables of the model
Variable Series Source
P Series constructed using the IPCA (\%a.m.) IBGE/SNIPC
TRANS Benefícios assistenciais (LOAS e RMV) R\$ (milhões)} Min. Fazenda/STN
RTL IR - pessoas físicas R\$ (milhões) Min. Fazenda/SRF
RTKp IR - pessoas jurídicas R\$ (milhões) Min. Fazenda/SRF
RTC ICMS and IPI R\$ (milhões) Min. Fazenda/SRF
BR Selic Over (\% a.m.) BCB Boletim/M. Finan.
Y PIB - preço de mercado - R\$ (milhões) IBGE/SCN 2000 Trim.
G Consumo final - adm. pública - R\$ (milhões) IBGE/SCN 2000 Trim.
C Consumo final - famílias - R\$ (milhões) IBGE/SCN 2000 Trim.
X Exportações - R\$ (milhões) IBGE/SCN 2000 Trim.
IMP Importações - R\$ (milhões) IBGE/SCN 2000 Trim.
L Horas pagas - indústria geral - índice (jan. 2001 = 100) PIMES/IBGE
FR Estados Unidos - taxa de juros (\% a.a.)
Fundo Monetário Internacional,      
International Financial Statistics
S Taxa de câmbio - R\$ / US\$ - comercial - compra - média
Banco Central do Brasil, Boletim, 
Seção Balanço de Pagamentos 
(BCB Boletim/BP)
Source: Own calculations.
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Table 2 - Calibration of the Parameters
Parameters Value Source
β 0.985 Cavalcanti and Vereda (2010)
σ 2 Cavalcanti and Vereda (2010)
σ 1.5 Cavalcanti and Vereda (2010)
1α 0.3 Mussolini (2011)
2α 0.6 Mussolini (2011)
3α 0.1 Mussolini (2011)
δ 0,025 Cavalcanti and Vereda (2010)
Gδ 0.025 Cavalcanti and Vereda (2010)
Rω 0.6 Castro et al (2011)
 
SS
F
SS
Y
B
-0,1 Sensitivity Analysis (Iskrev, 2010)
 
SS
SS
Y
B
1 Sensitivity Analysis (Iskrev, 2010)
SS
SS
Y
TRANS
0,1 Sensitivity Analysis (Iskrev, 2010)
2ψ 1 Sensitivity Analysis (Iskrev, 2010)
χ 1 Sensitivity Analysis (Iskrev, 2010)
Gγ 0 Stähler and Thomas (2012)
Gφ 0 Stähler and Thomas (2012)
IGγ 0 Stähler and Thomas (2012)
 IGφ 0 Stähler and Thomas (2012)
ψ ( ) ( )





−−+ δ
β
τ 111 CS Predetermined
Source: Own calculations.
Iskrev (2010) provides a method for testing the set of combination 
of parameters’ values in order that Blanchard and Kahn (1980) con-
ditions are met. Subsequently, from this set of values the procedure 
was to choose those values for the parameters that fulfill the con-
ditions which are considered standard in the literature. As in 2014 
the public sector net external debt was around -10% of GDP, the 
parameter 
 
SS
F
SS
Y
B  was given a value of -0.1. Castro et al. (2011) give 
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the ratio public debt to GDP a value of 200%. In our view, the latter 
value is perhaps too high, so we opt to be more conservative and use 
 
SS
SS
Y
B
 (ratio public debt to GDP a value of 100%).
Obtaining the average value of total transfers from the government 
to households is by no means an easy task. This is why we rec-
kon that a value of 10% as a percentage of GDP would be more 
than acceptable 
 






= 1.0.
SS
SS
Y
TRANS . As regards the parameters 2ψ  and 
χ , since they are not fiscal-policy-related variables, we decided to 
normalize these parameters to 1.
The parameters  IGGG φφγ ,,  and IGγ  were set at zero, following 
Stahler and Thomas (2012). This choice implies that fiscal policy 
reacts through changes in taxes, and not through changes in govern-
ment spending. This seems to be the case in key episodes of recent 
Brazilian economic history. For instance, at the outset of the Real 
plan, the fiscal consolidation process mainly rested on the CPMF 
(Temporary Tax on Financial Transactions, Contribuição Provisória 
sobre Movimentação Financeira in Portuguese).4 Given the prior dis-
tributions of the parameters, we estimate the posterior distributions 
using a Markov chain process via the Metropolis-Hastings algorithm 
with 100.000 iterations, a scale value 0.3 to be used for the jumping 
distribution, and 10 parallel chains for Metropolis-Hastings algori-
thm.5 The results of the Bayesian estimation are shown in Table 3 
and Figure 1.
These graphs are especially relevant in that they present key results, 
but they can also serve as tools to detect problems or build addi-
tional confidence in one’s results. First, the prior and the posterior 
distribution should not be excessively different from one another. 
Second, the posterior distributions should be close to normal, or at 
least not display a shape that is clearly non-normal. Third, the green 
mode should not be too far away from the mode of the posterior 
distribution. Overall, it is worth pointing out that the estimates 
proved to be quite satisfactory.
4 See Giambiagi (2008, 2009).
5 For information on the Bayesian estimation, consult: De Jong and Dave, 2007; and Canova, 
2007.
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Table 3 - Posterior distribution of the model
Parameter prior mean post. mean 90\% HPD interval prior pstdev
 C
SSτ 0.160 0.1640 0.1519 0.1760 beta 0.0100
 L
SSτ 0.170 0.1772 0.1694 0.1855 beta 0.0100
 K
SSτ 0.080 0.0616 0.0528 0.0702 beta 0.0100
TRANSγ 0.500 0.5614 0.4560 0.6900 beta 0.1000
Cτγ 0.500 0.7303 0.6409 0.8369 beta 0.1000
Lτγ 0.500 0.5166 0.4244 0.6037 beta 0.1000
Kτγ 0.500 0.4959 0.3764 0.6131 beta 0.1000
TRANSφ -0.500 -0.2750 -0.5127 -0.0897 unif 0.2887
Cτφ 0.500 0.5632 0.2802 1.0000 unif 0.2887
Lτφ 0.500 0.0163 0.0000 0.0404 unif 0.2887
Kτφ 0.500 0.0374 0.0000 0.0794 unif 0.2887
 BFχ -0.003 -0.0045 -0.0050 -0.0039 unif 0.0014
Xγ 0.500 0.5042 0.3953 0.6010 beta 0.1000
Xφ 0.500 0.1456 0.0000 0.3211 unif 0.2887
Dω 0.850 0.8364 0.8240 0.8493 beta 0.0100
Dψ 5.000 3.2352 2.8044 3.6456 gamma 0.5000
INSDφ 0.850 0.8787 0.8280 0.9330 beta 0.0500
θ 0.750 0.7445 0.7285 0.7587 beta 0.0100
Wθ 0.750 0.7535 0.7443 0.7638 beta 0.0100
ψ 10.000 13.0704 8.7269 18.4005 gamma 5.0000
Wψ 10.000 15.4805 9.2004 27.2836 gamma 5.0000
Cφ 0.800 0.7957 0.7850 0.8052 beta 0.0100
Rγ 0.500 0.3262 0.2338 0.4251 beta 0.1000
Yγ 0.500 0.4530 0.3985 0.5070 gamma 0.0500
πγ 3.000 3.0646 2.9539 3.1823 gamma 0.1000
aρ 0.500 0.5549 0.4837 0.6312 beta 0.1000
Gρ 0.500 0.4751 0.3675 0.5866 beta 0.1000
IGρ 0.500 0.5187 0.4288 0.6076 beta 0.1000
TRANSρ 0.500 0.5713 0.4729 0.6780 beta 0.1000
Cτρ 0.500 0.5450 0.4274 0.6552 beta 0.1000
Lτρ 0.500 0.3698 0.2677 0.4684 beta 0.1000
Kτρ 0.500 0.6862 0.5464 0.8346 beta 0.1000
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Table 3 - Posterior distribution of the model - (continuation)
Parameter prior mean post. mean 90\% HPD interval prior pstdev
mρ 0.500 0.5450 0.3892 0.7256 beta 0.1000
Pρ 0.500 0.4334 0.3665 0.5150 beta 0.1000
Lρ 0.500 0.4571 0.3523 0.5652 beta 0.1000
Iρ 0.500 0.6123 0.5276 0.7025 beta 0.1000
Xρ 0.500 0.4939 0.3838 0.6053 beta 0.1000
 RFρ 0.500 0.5828 0.4928 0.6684 beta 0.1000
PFρ 0.500 0.7764 0.6953 0.9045 beta 0.1000
ε 1.0 0.1321 0.1176 0.1476 invg Inf
Gε 1.0 0.1308 0.1176 0.1452 invg Inf
IGε 1.0 1.3021 0.9808 1.7152 invg Inf
TRANSε 1.0 0.5577 0.2982 0.7773 invg Inf
Cτε 1.0 0.2236 0.1620 0.2732 invg Inf
Lτε 1.0 0.1827 0.1504 0.2129 invg Inf
Kτε 1.0 0.2195 0.1798 0.2587 invg Inf
mε 1.0 0.1272 0.1176 0.1383 invg Inf
Pε 1.0 0.3266 0.1955 0.4582 invg Inf
Lε 1.0 0.4286 0.2229 0.6244 invg Inf
Iε 1.0 0.5671 0.4055 0.7249 invg Inf
Xε 1.0 0.1386 0.1176 0.1561 invg Inf
RFε 1.0 0.1267 0.1176 0.1377 invg Inf
PFε 1.0 0.1468 0.1214 0.1691 invg Inf
Source: Own elaboration.
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Figure 1- Priors and posteriors. 
SourceOwn calculations.
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6.  Results
This section analyzes the dynamic properties of the model by fo-
cusing on the shocks decomposition of the GDP and the fiscal 
multipliers.
6.1.   Shocks decomposition
One way to assess the effects of the different shocks on GDP fluc-
tuations is to look into the decomposition of these shocks (Figure 
2). Two variables were found relevant in accounting for the output 
behavior: current spending and public investment. Both performed 
similarly, reducing output over the period 2003 to 2006, as a strong 
fiscal adjustment was under way. However, during the period in 
which the Growth Acceleration Programs (PAC, in Portuguese) pre-
vailed - PAC1 and PAC2 were initiated in 2007 and 2010, respec-
tively -, government expenditure and public investment played an 
important role in boosting aggregate demand.
6.2.   Fiscal multipliers analysis
In this section, we turn to gauging the fiscal multipliers for each 
fiscal shock (Figure 3). The results are in accordance with what 
was presented in Section 2, namely, in the small-economy case the 
multipliers should be smaller than 0.5 - it is worth remarking that 
these would be even smaller if there were a pressing need to put 
the fiscal house in order to keep public debt stable (Spilimbergo 
et al., 2009). The greatest multiplier found in this work was that 
of the consumption-tax excise reduction. Its associated value was 
0.09 on impact, reaching 0.12 at 8 periods, with this number falling 
steadily over 16 quarters on the grounds of the need to adjust other 
fiscal tools, since the falling tax revenues led to a growing public 
debt (perceived effect by MOURA (2015) and by CAVALCANTI 
and SILVA (2010)). This growth was, however, temporary and the 
multiplier resumed growing.
The second-largest multiplier is the one associated with public spen-
ding. On impact, its value was 0.055. The ensuing fiscal adjustment 
caused this value to drop (for the same reason as in the case of the 
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preceding multiplier), bottoming out at 0.04 and then bouncing back 
thereafter until reaching a stable level. Concerning the public-in-
vestment multiplier, its value on impact was smaller than the earlier 
figures, 0.003, it thereon embarked on a downward path (thereby 
mimicking somehow the behavior of the prior fiscal measures’ mul-
tipliers) but its upward trajectory after the rebounding was steeper 
than those of the previous fiscal policies. The reason is that a po-
sitive shock to public investment renders firms more productive as 
the higher investment turns into capital stock (In the same way as 
in MOURA (2015)).
The only income-tax measure yielding a positive multiplier is the 
tax exemption from labor income. On impact, the value was modest 
- 0.005 -, but in the longer run this number improved due to the 
increase in the households’ labor supply. The same policy applied to 
capital income gave rise to a negative result at any horizon.
Figure 2 - GDP Shocks Decomposition
Source: Own calculations.
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Figure 3 - Fiscal multipliers for each fiscal shock 
Source: Own calculations.
7. Conclusions
This article intended to make a contribution to the discussion about 
the effects of the Brazilian fiscal policy after the 2008 crisis. In this 
vein, a shocks decomposition for Brazilian GDP as well as a multi-
plier analysis of each fiscal shock were undertaken under the fra-
mework of a New Keynesian model. The spending-based measures 
were the most successful in affecting GDP over the whole period 
studied, primarily because of PAC2, whose actual goal was to bolster 
aggregate demand. However, this stimulus program had a positive 
result until 2013, thereafter the deterioration of this type of fiscal 
policy negatively affected the Brazilian economic result.
The form chosen to compare the different possibilities of fiscal poli-
cies was the fiscal multiplier.  The exemption of tax on consumption 
showed better results, followed by the multiplier of public spen-
ding. The other multipliers showed relatively insignificant. Given 
these results, relieve the tax on consumption and increase current 
spending would be the best possibilities to stimulate the economy. 
Still, it can be noted in the shocks decomposition, that this second 
policy was one of the tools used to stimulate the economy in the 
PAC programs.
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